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Imitation in Fashion: Further Reflections of the work of Thorstein Veblen and 
Georg Simmel  
 
Abstract 
Imitation continues to play a significant role within the fashion industry, but not in the 
way that Thorstein Veblen and Georg Simmel, who wrote over one hundred years 
ago, suggest. Increased inequality in incomes, the adoption of an ethics of labour over 
leisure, and the creation of celebrities within the music and movie industries, who 
appear proximate to a broad demographic of consumers, means the social elite are no 
longer the predominant trendsetters and exemplars of sartorial tastes. More 
fundamentally, globalisation has reduced interpersonal connections and increased 
feelings of isolation within many individuals. Correlatively, periods of the past, which 
offer security, stability and status, have become an increasingly important source of 
sartorial – and cultural – imitation, as evidenced by the growing popularity of retro 
and vintage clothing styles. An awareness of the role played by heritage and history in 
the consumption of fashion is therefore important for researchers in academia and 
industry.  
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Introduction 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Thorstein Veblen (1899) and Georg 
Simmel ([1904] 1971) explained how imitation acted as both cause and catalyst in the 
creation and consumption of new sartorial vogues. In the twenty-first century, the role 
of imitation is no less significant within the fashion cycle, but societal transformations 
during the intervening centuries have opened the separate analyses of Veblen and 
Simmel to questions and doubt. Consequently, whilst there have been attempts to 
reappraise these theories, notably by McCracken (1990), Trigg (2001) and Shipman 
(2004), there have been suggestions that they are time bound and of limited relevance 
today (Davis 1992: 9; Entwistle 2000: 163; Royek 2000). 
 
This paper argues that the works of Veblen and Simmel remain necessary for a 
comprehensive understanding of the fashion cycle, but contends that societal 
developments, which have facilitated the growth of global enterprises and global 
governing organisations, have divested many people of the interpersonal bonds that 
facilitated imitation within the fashion cycle. Increasing disparity between the wealthy 
and the rest, more especially the rise of a plutocracy, who form a distinctive niche 
within the top one percent of earners (Freeland, 2012), means that individuals 
perceived to be at the very apex of society are not necessarily admired and aped 
because of their clothing choices. In one sense, the social elite – defined as those 
individuals whose high incomes give them commensurate social and/or political 
significance – have become too remote because of their prodigious earning ability; in 
another sense, they are too familiar. The pervasiveness of a (predominantly western) 
work ethic that compels even the wealthiest people to eschew leisure and to labour 
means the privileged and underprivileged share broadly comparable living patterns 
centred on paid employment. Possessing few of their nineteenth-century 
characteristics, which singled them out as Thorstein Veblen’s Leisure Class, the social 
elite are no longer emulated to the extent they were. 
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The creation of celebrities from within the music, movie and sports industries, who 
appear proximate to a wide demographic of consumers, have emerged as more 
suitable objects of reverie and emulation, although this is not a straightforward case of 
transferred allegiances. The frequency with which individual celebrities and other 
prominent public personalities fall from the media’s gaze suggests it is the ideals they 
convey, curated by the brands and institutions they represent, rather than their 
individual personalities and characteristics, that are the real source of popular 
imitation. The messages that brands broadcast, which offer, to varying degrees, 
security, stability and status, by referencing heritage, custom and shared cultural 
experiences, transcend personalities; they endure long after the ‘pin-ups’ and ‘faces’ 
of specific marketing campaigns have faded from thought. To invert Marshal 
McLuhan’s memorable phrase, the medium is no longer the message. 
 
If the message is reclaiming its importance, it is largely to assuage feelings of 
isolation. Sociologists have long observed that feelings of anxiety and loneliness 
become preponderant in complex and technologically advanced societies where social 
networks are large and impersonal (Bauman 2007; de Certeau 1984; Durkheim 1961 
Elias [1897] 1991; Habermas 1987; Wild 2014). To assuage feelings of despondency, 
people seek comfort and a sense of place by reverting to values that may be regarded 
as traditional or foundational, as noted by Douglas Holt in his advocacy of Cultural 
Branding (Holt 2004: 8). In the twenty-first century, periods of the past have therefore 
become an important source of sartorial – and more generally, cultural – imitation. 
Within the fashion industry this trend is apparent in the increased frequency with 
which historic vogues and brands are being conspicuously revived and recycled. If it 
seems ironic that a desire for individual security and belonging is pursued in so 
impersonal a manner, Zygmunt Bauman’s observations regarding ‘Liquid Modernity’, 
where (western) society’s ‘self-propelling, self-intensifying, compulsive and 
obsessive ‘modernization’ [means that] none of the consecutive forms of social life is 
able to maintain its shape for long’ (Bauman 2011: 11), make it hardly surprising. 
That said, the rise of the peer-to-peer marketplaces, where, in the case of clothing, 
individuals hire out their wardrobes to strangers, has been seen as an attempt to 
cultivate interpersonal bonds and trust (Lohman 2014). This suggests a desire to 
emulate and revive values associated with the past is driven as much by consumers as 
the companies who sell to them. 
 
Veblen, Simmel & Imitation within Fashion  
The idea of imitation has invidious associations, but it plays a significant role within 
the fashion cycle. The foundational works of Thorstein Veblen and Georg Simmel 
described how people’s desire to emulate individuals perceived as socially superior to 
them acted as both cause and catalyst in the creation and consumption of new sartorial 
vogues. Clothing styles, which are responsive to and reflective of societal mores, 
made them a universally useful – if frequently problematic (cf. Lurie 2000) – 
communicator, for as Veblen baldy opined, ‘without reflection or analysis, we feel 
that what is inexpensive is unworthy. “A cheap coat makes a cheap man”’ (Veblen 
1899: 112). Veblen argued that the nexus of imitation derived from anxiety among 
those people who did not possess the luxuries of the Leisure Class, chiefly their 
ability to engage in wasteful behaviour, the squandering of time and money 
especially. A crucial signifier of the Leisure Class’ privileged position was dress. 
Their ostentatious and impractical clothing demonstrated financial fortitude and the 
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ability to live without labouring (Veblen 1899: 111-14). It was also regularly renewed 
so as to remain fashionable: 
 
To preserve their status, the Class wanted to acquire the most costly, and thus 
beautiful, objects. This necessitated sartorial innovation to create more 
glorious garments, particularly for women whose dress flaunted the success of 
their male masters (Veblen 1899: 119). The endeavour proved to be as pricey 
as it was pointless, for conspicuous expenditure, wasteful because it does not 
the serve a common good, is offensive and inherently ugly (Veblen 1899: 116-
18). The Leisure Class were inadvertently using raiment to realize materially a 
sense of reassurance they could not achieve mentally. (Wild 2014: 220) 
 
Simmel’s interest in people’s imitation of fashion was more theoretical. He suggested 
that imitation provided a means for people to mediate the omnipresent tension that 
existed between their desire for social conformity and personal distinction (Simmel 
[1904] 1971: 19). The facility of clothing to convey messages about an individual’s 
social status led him to believe that an understanding of the fashion cycle would help 
to elucidate complex social relationships. Underpinning the theoretical and practical 
implications of both men’s work was a rigid social hierarchy. Clear demarcations 
between different social strata, and a desire by people occupying lower rungs of the 
figurative ladder to climb, engendered what is commonly referred to as a ‘trickle-
down’ process of imitation. It is the gradual disillusion of rigid social hierarchies 
within the West, in particular, that has led some scholars to question the continuing 
utility of Veblen and Simmel’s work, notably Davis (1992: 9), Entwistle (2000: 163) 
and Rojek (2000). 
 
Reappraising Simmel’s ‘Trickle-Down’ theory and Veblen’s Leisure Class 
Attempts have been made to demonstrate the continued relevance of Veblen and 
Simmel’s work with reference to twenty-first century patterns of consumption. 
Spencer James, for example, has used Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of ‘neotribes’ to 
show how people forge identities through the goods they purchase (James 2009: 71). 
Other scholars, chiefly McCracken (1990), Trigg (2001) and Shipman (2004), have 
adapted the work of Veblen and Simmel to preserve its utility. 
 
Grant McCraken has suggested that the utility of Georg Simmel’s ‘trickle-down’ 
theory is compromised because it offers no motivation for people’s imitation of 
individuals perceived to be socially superior to them. It fails to identify an end result 
of the imitation (McCracken 1990: 100) and does not satisfactorily predict when the 
emergence of one fashion innovation would trigger ‘the eventual appearance of a 
second reactive innovation’ (McCracken 1990: 96). McCracken regarded this 
predictive quality to be one of the chief advantages of Simmel’s model. In his 
reappraisal, he thereby emphasises the importance of knowing when fashion changes 
occur. The significant change he makes to Simmel’s work is to shift the cycle of 
imitation from one based on social groups to one based on gender, where female 
professionals are the imitators and male professionals are the imitated (McCracken 
1990: 96-7). Women copy elements of men’s dress to disassociate themselves from 
the negative connotations conveyed by their clothing in the hope that they can gain 
acceptance as equal and competent partners to men (McCracken 1990: 100). 
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McCracken’s reappraisal of Simmel’s work is thought-provoking, but in assuming 
that professional women are perceived, by themselves and others, to be subordinate to 
professional men, its central premise is untenable. Whilst women may continue to 
suffer some workplace discrimination, chiefly with regards to their pay, ongoing 
studies of the relationships between men and women suggests McCracken’s analysis 
is too simplistic. Where some research indicates that young men are comfortable with 
women possessing comparable or more privileged educational backgrounds (Bingham 
2014), other studies describe an intensification in the ‘mascularization’ of 
consumption since the 1980s, whereby men choose gender-specific products, services 
and relationships, in response to socio-economic changes that preference women. 
(Galilee 2005: 32-34). Research has also indicated that young men feel constrained 
and enervated by socially defined notions of acceptable male body image, which is 
generally ‘lean, well-toned [and of] muscular build’ (Frith and Gleeson 2004: 41; 
Hancock II and Karaminas 2014). The cumulative implication of this diverse research 
is that men can feel as socially and professionally vulnerable as women regarding 
their appearance, if not more so. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the 
ascendancy of women in recent decades has been so swift and successful that it has 
triggered a terminal crisis of masculinity (Rosin 2012). 
 
Subsequent attempts to reappraise the work of Veblen and Simmel have continued 
their socio-economic focus. The most thoroughgoing reappraisal of the role of 
imitation along these lines is that undertaken by Andrew Trigg. He argues that three 
main criticisms of Veblen’s work, based on ‘misrepresentation and over-
simplification’ (Trigg 2001: 104), can be overcome if his Leisure Class is studied in 
conjunction with Pierre Bourdieu’s writing on distinction (Bourdieu, 1984). The first 
criticism, that the ‘trickle-down’ process is too restrictive because ‘pacesetters for 
consumption’ could emerge at lower points in the social hierarchy, can be surmounted 
by suggesting that imitation is more akin to a ‘trickle-round’ process (Trigg 2001: 
107). According to Bourdieu, ‘cultural capital’ – defined by Trigg ‘as the 
accumulated stock of knowledge about products and intellectual traditions, which is 
learned through educational training and also through social upbringing’ (Trigg 2001: 
104) – is a more sophisticated means of conveying status than conspicuous 
consumption. Veblen had acknowledged this point. He suggested that accumulated 
culture was an important means by which established members of the Leisure Class 
could distinguish themselves from novitiates (Veblen 1899: 34-36). The distinction 
derived through cultural capital is based on taste, which typically manifests itself as 
an aversion, certainly a differentiation, from the popular and the norm (Trigg 2001: 
105-6). To maintain their lofty position from middle class emulators, Bourdieu 
observes that members of the upper classes periodically adopt working class 
behaviours (Bourdieu 1984: 185, 209). Trigg cites the preference for peasant dishes 
among a social elite used to haute cuisine, folk music and sport (Trigg 2001: 106). 
Members of the working class, whom Bourdieu suggests repudiate patterns of elite 
consumption, can therefore influence a ‘trickle-up’ practice of consumption, making 
the imitative relationship cyclical, rather than vertical. 
 
The second criticism, that today’s consumers display their wealth in subtler forms, is 
apparently based on too superficial a reading of Veblen’s text, which acknowledges 
that some consumers’ display of wealth is less conspicuous (Trigg 2001: 108; Veblen 
1899: 103). Bourdieu’s conception of the habitus – people’s socially acquired values, 
behaviours and thought – suggests ‘a standard of decency’ – in this context, patterns 
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of consumption – will be adopted by individuals to accord with the community of 
which they are a member (Trigg 2001: 113). The habitus can also be used to 
overcome the third criticism of Veblen’s theory, namely, that social hierarchies are 
not the sole determinant of consumer behaviour (Trigg 2001: 99). By acknowledging 
the socializing force of the habitus and being aware of lifestyle differences, which are 
associated with an individual’s level of cultural and economic capital, it is possible to 
show how patterns of consumption change among and within classes, a point Veblen 
recognized but did not develop (Trigg 2001: 110). Trigg clarifies Bourdieu’s thought 
using the following diagram (Trigg 2001: 111): 
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By way of explanation, people with Lifestyle A possess the economic resources for 
costly consumption and have the knowledge to appreciate ‘legitimate culture’ (Trigg 
2001: 111); their opposite is represented by Lifestyle D. Lifestyle B represents people 
who have the money for high-price cultural consumption, but lack the inclination; 
Lifestyle C represents people who have a high appreciation of culture, but lack the 
money to fully sate their cultural appetite (Trigg 2001: 111). Concepts enunciated by 
Bourdieu can therefore help to remove the social hierarchy and rigidity of Veblen’s 
original theory. 
 
Trigg’s reappraisal of Veblen’s thesis has been pursued further by Alan Shipman, 
who contends that a continuing focus on material consumption is misplaced because 
‘social preference and public policy [have tended] to drive a reorientation of 
conspicuous consumption, from the physicality of consumption to the conspicuity of 
preferences’ (Shipman 2004: 281). If an excess of material consumption now 
provides diminished legitimacy (Shipman 2004: 280), if it has become ‘vulnerable to 
financial attack’ through taxation and scarcity (Shipman 2004: 281), and if 
governments have asserted their right to the ‘worthier objects of individual indulgence 
– notably the patronage of the arts and scientific research, and the duty of poverty 
relief’, thereby divesting the wealthy of their ‘stabilising activity’ (Shipman 2004: 
280), the social elite have moved from demonstrating conspicuous consumption to 
‘symbolic consumption’ (Shipman 2004: 277). In this new scenario, which 
preferences experiences over exhibits and taste over waste, connoisseurship and 
cultural capital are prized, as consumers demonstrate skill and perception in their 
selection goods and services (Shipman 2004: 281-2). Branding facilitates the 
awareness of the extra-material benefits of goods and services. Much maligned, most 
notably by Naomi Klein (2000), Shipman contends that branding has the potential to 
engender positive economic, ecological and social change, by overcoming pricing-
power imbalances, labour and resource exploitation (Shipman 2004: 285). It can also 
reduce stress on natural materials through the promotion of ‘de-materialized’ values 
(Shipman 2004: 287). In the context of status consumption, Shipman suggests that 
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‘Instead of a trickle-down of elite material consumption, which could exhaust 
resource stocks and overfill pollution sinks once extended to the masses, the promise 
is of a lifting-up to elite symbolic consumption, healing social disparity without 
courting ecological disaster’ (Shipman 2004: 287).  
 
Shipman is right to remind us of non-material factors in the distribution and display of 
personal wealth, but consumer behaviour across the world indicates the wealthy, and 
consumers more generally, still continue to value products that convey socio-
economic status. In Cambodia, for example, where average annual per capita income 
is $1000, Rolls-Royce, whose cars sell for a minimum of £299,999, made ten sales 
between June and July 2014 (Peel 2014). Moreover, government organisations do not 
have a monopoly on civic patronage. Members of the plutocracy continue the work of 
their nineteenth-century forebears as social benefactors (Camplin 1978). For example, 
the recently opened Foundation Louis Vuitton in Paris is a privately funded cultural 
institution by LVMH CEO Bernard Arnault (Foulkes 2014). The altruistic activities 
of the world’s wealthiest have now become so significant, in both senses of the term, 
that they warrant their own phrase, ‘philanthro-capitalism’ (Freeland 2014: 71). 
Making distinctions between government and the very wealthy is also far harder than 
Shipman implies. According to Chrystia Freeland, ‘nearly half of all members of 
[America’s] Congress – 250 in all – were millionaires in 2010, and their median net 
worth was $913,000, more than nine times the national average [...] At least ten 
lawmakers are full-fledged plutocrats, with fortunes of more than $100 million’ 
(Freeland 2012: 269). 
 
If the work of McCracken, Trigg and Shipman has specific shortcomings, a general 
problem is that none of these accounts consider the role of dress in imitation, aside 
from Trigg’s highly gendered consideration of work attire. Dress had been central to 
the original arguments of Veblen and Simmel on emulation because of its ubiquity 
and widely perceived facility to signify social position. Moreover, all of these major 
reappraisals were written before the economic downturn of 2008, which caused the 
‘global destruction of wealth on the most colossal scale since the Second World War’ 
(Freeland 2012: 143). Consequently, the studies’ conclusions are not cognisant of the 
profound socio-economic changes that have affected socio-economic relationships 
since, chiefly the increased disparity in incomes and the stratification that has 
occurred within the top one per cent of earners. Mindful of the fact that fashions 
reflect the society in which they are produced, periods of disruption will affect what is 
worn. As G. Bruce Boyer and Patricia Mears observe in their study of fashions during 
the tumultuous 1930s, it is in times of crisis that ‘various aspects of culture often 
come to assume hyper-importance. Certainly in the 1930s, the cinema, jazz, and the 
automobile played such a role. Clothing did, too’ (Mears and Bruce Boyer 2014: 4). If 
the writing of Veblen and Simmel regarding imitation is to remain relevant to 
contemporary studies of the fashion cycle, there is a renewed need to reconsider its 
main conclusions in light of recent social transformations. 
 
No One to Imitate 
Since the nineteenth century the means and motivation for imitation has changed, 
chiefly because the affects of globalisation and the advent of finance capital have 
weakened social hierarchies and interpersonal bonds. The dissolution of social 
hierarchies was exacerbated by the global recession – or whatever analogous phrase is 
preferred – that began in 2008. The subsequent years of financial stringency 
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highlighted and heightened the growing disparity in people’s incomes, more 
especially among the top one percent of earners. Within Britain, for example, ‘the 
country’s five richest families now own more wealth than the poorest 20% of the 
population’ (Elliott 2014). The consequences of this seismic socio-economic shift are 
hard to overstate. Whilst examples of conspicuous consumption remain prevalent, a 
tendency among the wealthiest of the social elite to foster their own cultural and 
social networks has continued, with events like Davos, the World Economic Forum’s 
invitation-only annual meeting (Freeland 2012: 67-68). Participation in this particular 
event also reveals that today’s social elite are very different to their nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century forbears, because they continue to work: 
 
[Peter Lindert] has found that in 1916 the richest 1 percent of Americans 
received only one-fifth of their income from paid work; in 2004, that figure 
had risen threefold to 60 percent. “As a consequence, top executives (the 
‘working rich’) have replaced top capital owners (the ‘rentiers’) at the top of 
the income hierarchy during the twentieth century” Saez and Piketty write in 
their seminal paper on the subject. (Freeland 2012: 43). 
 
The emphasis on labour over leisure has led some of the wealthiest of the super elite 
to be termed ‘alpha geeks’ (Freeland 2012: 46-49). This is a far cry from the 
profligate and pleasure-seeking Leisure Class identified by Veblen. These changes 
mean that today’s social elite are at once too inaccessible and too ordinary to be a 
source of sustained reverie and imitation in the manner conceived by Veblen and 
Simmel. 
 
If the impact of the global recession on social hierarchies was immediately noticeable 
and quantifiable, the development of finance capital has had a subtler, but no less 
profound, effect in dissolving interpersonal bonds and changing the nature of 
imitation. In his seminal paper ‘Culture and Finance Capital’, Frederic James, who 
follows economist Karl Polanyi in his belief that the development of a global 
economy fundamentally changed people’s conceptions of society and self (Polanyi 
[1944] 2001), cogently links Western society’s conception of money to its cultural 
appreciation and output. At an earlier stage in the development of a global economy, 
the exchange of physical goods and specie led to: 
 
a more realistic interest in the body of the world and in new and more lively 
human relationships developed by trade. The merchants and their consumers 
need[ed] to take a keener interest in the sensory nature of their wares as well 
as in the psychological and characterological traits of their interlocutors. These 
new interests develop[ed] new kinds of perceptions, both physical and social – 
new kinds of seeing, new types of behaviour – and in the long run create[d] 
the conditions in which more realistic art forms [were] not only possible but 
desirable, and encouraged by their new public’ (Jameson 1997: 254). 
 
Prosaically, the exchange and accumulation of specie encouraged correspondingly 
tangible expressions regarding its personal and public benefits. 
 
By contrast, the development of finance capital, which transformed money into a 
concept, led to ‘dematerialization’ – where messages and physical objects can be 
transmitted ‘instantaneously from one nodal point to another’ through cyberspace – 
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‘decontextualization’ – when things are wrenched out of their ‘original context’ – and 
‘deterritorialization’ – when the original usage and nature of an object ‘becomes 
insignificant’ (Jameson 1997: 259-260) – rendering people’s conception of culture, 
and themselves, increasingly abstract. Calls for a return to gold are becoming 
increasingly cognisant of the psychological unease that pervades finance capital (Tett 
2014).  
 
James is not alone, and certainly not the first, to suggest that global economic 
developments make people commercially closer and personally distant. Bauman 
(2007), Durkheim (1961), Elias ([1987] 1991) Habermas (1987) and Simmel ([1903] 
1971) have all suggested that technologically and financially advanced societies dilute 
or, at the most extreme, dissolve interpersonal relationships and increase feelings of 
personal loneliness. The loneliness and anxiety within contemporary society negates 
the form of imitation described by Veblen and Simmel because the increasing absence 
of fixed hierarchies and stable sartorial signifiers means the merits of aping others 
become ambiguous; if there is limited reason to suppose that the act of personal 
imitation will increase social prestige or provide psychological reassurance, there is 
little reason to do it. 
 
Whilst personal imitation – in particular, adopting the consumption patterns of the 
social elite – may have diminishing social returns, imitation as a social phenomenon 
continues in a variant form. Popular media – magazines, music, television – 
demonstrates that imitation remains a compelling form of behaviour for virtually all 
people, not least regarding their wardrobes, but the waxing and waning of celebrity 
fortunes suggests that people increasingly attach themselves to the ideas and ideals of 
the brands that these individuals represent, rather than their personalities. 
 
Brands appeals because they are ‘imbued with stories that consumers find valuable in 
constructing their identities. Consumers flock to brands that embody the ideals they 
admire, brands that help them express who they want to be’ (Holt 2004: 3-4). 
According to marketing analyst Douglas Holt, the ideas that iconic brands convey 
relate to ‘imaginary’ or ‘populist’ worlds, ‘places separated not only from everyday 
life but also from the realms of commerce and elite control [where people, who often 
live ‘at the margins of society’] share a distinct ethos that provides intrinsic 
motivation for their actions’ (Holt 2004: 9). Holt’s case studies reveal that the 
‘imaginary’ and ‘populist’ worlds often connect to an idealised time in a nation’s past, 
what might conventionally be termed a ‘golden age’. It is this halcyon historical 
narrative that enables brands to construct credible and compelling ‘identity myths’, 
especially at times of social disruption, akin to that caused by the 2008 global 
recession: 
 
Identity myths are useful fabrications that stitch back together otherwise 
damaging tears in the cultural fabric of the nation. In their everyday lives, 
people experience these tears as personal anxieties. Myths smooth over these 
tensions, helping people create purpose in their lives and cement their desired 
identity in place when it is under stress (Holt 2004: 8).  
 
Holt’s arguments about identity myths are particularly relevant to the fashion industry 
because it is through their clothing choices that consumers tend to ‘value products as 
a means of self-expression’ (Holt 2004: 5). 
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Imitation within the Fashion Industry 
The fashion industry has long revelled in, and revived, elements of its history. Many 
of the most prestigious fashion houses feature the date of foundation in their logo and 
use advertisements to convey elements of their distinguished heritage. The present 
ubiquity of vogues inspired by the past is not more of the same, however; for this is a 
difference of kind, not simply of degree. Many companies that have embraced historic 
styles of dress have chosen periods of the past with limited relevance to their own 
history, or for that matter, the personal experiences of their consumers, but which 
elide with the socially confused zeitgeist. The use of medieval-style dress, which has 
been incorporated into several catwalk collections in recent years, including Stella 
McCartney (Fall 2008), OntFront (Spring 2010) Vivienne Westwood (Fall 2013) and 
Dolce & Gabbana (Fall 2013), makes this point well. Whilst socially traumatic 
periods can engender a ‘fantasy culture’ (Mears and Bruce Boyer 2013: 4),  
 
[t]he arresting and angular creations of medieval couturiers, which appear 
simultaneously defensive and offensive, appeal to contemporary fashion 
designers because they reflect the financially frightened zeitgeist. By 
incorporating medieval themes into their clothes, designers like Vivienne 
Westwood, who make use of veils, hooded cloaks, asymmetric tailoring, 
elongated and transparent nails, can conceive of clothes that give their 
consumers a second skin by providing a confidence they have recently lost 
and a protection they crave (Wild 2013: 5). 
 
Within menswear, dress accessories from the 1920s and 1980s have become 
increasingly conspicuous. These trends are particularly interesting because the 
decades they reference were times when men’s social and political position seemed 
unassailable. Akin to medieval vogues, clothing styles for men – pocket squares, tie 
clips, boutonnières, correspondent shoes – are imitated to confer a sense of 
confidence that socio-economic situations have deprived their wearers of. And this is 
not a new phenomenon. The rival of ‘classic styles’ following a period of economic 
stringency was noted during the 1970s. For much of this recession, men wore 
conspicuously casual clothes (Jobling 2014: 145-46), but as the economy recovered, 
they reverted to ‘heroic elegance’ displaying ‘grace’, ‘polish’ and ‘richness’ in their 
choice of dress (McCracken 1988: 101). The present appeal to tradition helps to 
explain why British fashion label Hackett achieved a UK turnover of £107m. in 2013, 
a 10 per cent increase on the previous year. The company, which is frequently 
characterised as ‘nostalgic’ and ‘quintessentially British’, is looking at further global 
expansion in light of continuing demand for ‘Brand Britain’ (Shubber 2014). 
 
The economy’s role in shaping people’s approach to past fashions has become more 
important as culture has become a ‘superstructure to the economy’s base’ (Reynolds 
2011: 420). According to Simon Reynolds, who has looked at the revival of trends 
from the music industry’s recent past, the clamour for retro fashion and music occurs 
because of the cultural equivalent of economic ‘overaccumulation’. Music and 
fashion are analogous because of the stress they place on ‘topicality’ (Reynolds 2011: 
xix): 
 
Like a boom-time economy, the more fertile and dynamic a genre is, the more 
it sets itself up for the musical-cultural equivalent of recession: retro. In its 
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young, hyper-productive phase it burns through stages of development that 
would have been stretched out for longer, and lays down an immense stockpile 
of ideas that then exert a blackhole-like pull on later waves of artists 
(Reynolds 2011: 422). 
 
Imitation outside the Fashion Industry 
In a memorable scene involving a cerulean blue belt from David Frankel’s film The 
Devil Wears Prada (2006), the steely editor of Mode magazine maintains that she and 
her coterie of advisors dictate global fashions, and alludes to a ‘trickle-down’ 
sequence of sartorial imitation to make her point. In reality, the fragmented society 
that economic and technological developments have created means people are subject 
to numerous sartorial influences beyond those of the fashion industry. The myriad 
sources of easily accessible information, particularly that conveyed through social 
media, can drown the influence of the fashion commentators and brands, or dilute it, 
as people consciously search for alternative points of view. Either way, social and 
ethnic groups now have increased cause and opportunity to curate distinctive clothing 
combinations without direct reference to the advice offered by the fashion industry. 
The men from East London who wear their tie-less shirts buttoned up (Jonkers & van 
Bennekom 2013) or the Mexican men who customise cowboy-style boots with 
elongated toes (Roderiguez 2011), are examples of individuals whose dress has not 
been directly influenced by the fashion industry. Their clothing still bears the 
influence of societal values, however, and is similar to more populist clothing styles 
in that it imitates styles or revives ideas from the past; the buttoned-up shirts channel 
Mod aesthetics and values, the modified Mexican boots reference tribal music and 
dance. More generally, the rise of peer-to-peer marketplaces, where individuals let 
homes, cars and clothing to strangers, is another example of where consumers have 
begun to seek identity through the emulation and rekindling of traditional values – in 
this case, trust – through interpersonal means (Lohman 2014). 
 
Conclusion 
Imitation continues to play an important role within the fashion cycle, but not in the 
manner described by Thorstein Veblen and Georg Simmel. The writings of Veblen 
and Simmel on sartorial imitation remain significant for showing how clothing 
facilitates emulation, but economic and technological developments, which have 
diluted or entirely dissolved social hierarchies and interpersonal bonds, renders their 
notion of a ‘trickle-down’ process unrealistic. Sartorial – and cultural – imitation 
today is less about people and more about periods of the past. The emergence of a 
truly global society has given people many new opportunities for individualization, 
but it has also created feelings of anxiety and loneliness. To assuage these negative 
feelings, people are looking to possess material recreations from periods of the past. 
These objects offer the promise of security – through the values associated with them 
– that people no longer feel in the present. The desire to rekindle values and vogues 
from the past is pursued within and without the fashion industry and there is little sign 
of it ebbing as the global economy remains weak. Correlatively, researchers, whether 
in academia or industry, should aim to consider the role played by history and 
heritage as part of the cultural and psychological motivations for the consumption of 
fashion. 
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